chances of success,"[1] In both points McClellan's judgment proved to be at fault; Buell's army was, in the operations of the ensuing spring, needed to reinforce that of Halleck, and, in fact, his Department was merged in that of Halleck; and there ultimately proved to be no way of entering East Tennessee until an advance from Nashville to Chattanooga had secured for the Federals that important line of railway communication.

The Confederate Government, with better judgment, gave to General Albert Sidney Johnston the entire charge of military affairs west of the Alleghany Mountains.

The Confederates, as we have seen, had, early in September, seized the commanding positions of Columbus and Hickman on the river Mississippi, and the Federals had taken possession of Paducah and Southland at the mouths of the rivers Tennosstw ami Cumberland. Neither of the belligerents, however, was prepared for further active operations. Both sides had enough to do in raising troops for the inevitable contest. There was in both camps great deficiency of arms, but the Federals procured th«m sooner and in greater quantity than their opponentR were able to do. There was also more energy shown by the Western than by the Southwestern States in

the raising of men and furnishing of supplies. The Governors of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio—Yates, Morton, and Dennison—were men of marked ability and zeal. And it need not be said that the resources of every kind at the disposal of the United State's

[1] 4 W. R., 355.